Subject: frontline: the jesus factor: readings: against liberal monism; on secularism & religion | PBS

An Excerpt of the PBS Frontline Article:

These facts suggest a logic for religious engagement in the = civic realm=20 that clashes with a dominant strand of argument in academic = philosophy=20 that, although prominent in scholarly debates, has very little to = do with=20 how people actually talk and act. The academic philosophers insist = that=20 the convictions of the religious need to be translated into a = purely=20 secular idiom if the faithful are to join in political = deliberation. If=20 the religiously minded are not comfortable translating their = convictions=20 into such a secular idiom, they had best remain silent.

Some versions of this argument--for example, that associated = with the=20 late John Rawls--are subtle and complex. Others are much simpler. = They=20 assume that there is a single vocabulary for political discussion; = if your=20 speech lies out side the purview of a secular language of 'public=20 deliberation,' it isn't legitimately public speech at all.

The draconian requirement that a purely secular mode of speech = supplant=20 all other ways of making public argument cuts against the grain of = American political history and civic culture. In the real world of = religion and politics as they actually coexist in America, = citizens resort=20 to 'god talk' at least as much as they use 'rights talk.' Faith = informs=20 the way America speaks and has always spoken. The U.S. = Constitution never=20 required that people give up the communal dimensions of their = faith as the=20 price for civic admission. Catholics, Lutherans, Jews--all built = networks=20 of schools and charitable institutions. Jews, in particular, = distinguished=20 themselves publicly through visible markers of their identity in = dress and=20 in dietary regulations. Even a cursory glance at our history shows = the=20 manner in which confessional pluralism and social pluralism have = been=20 linked in the American polity as religious differences were marked = publicly through a variety of modes of communal identification. = One reason=20 that America's religious institutions are such an indispensable = part of=20 American civil society is that religion in America has never been=20 compelled to privatize itself along the lines suggested by = Rawls.

For the first 150 years of the American republic, primary=20 responsibility for religious rights and liberties was lodged in = the=20 states. No federal law governing religious institutions in their = relation=20 to the government was ever passed. The federal government got into = the act=20 where religion is concerned--at least in a big way--only during = the last=20 half century.

In recent years, a constitutional position has emerged that = might be=20 called strong separationism. This position seeks to do on the = level of law=20 what a strict version of Rawlsian philosophy aims to do in the = realm of=20 discourse-namely, to strip public life of religious markers, = emblems, and=20 ceremony.

I have called this position liberal monism, for its origins lie = in=20 certain strands of classical liberal political philosophy. This = position=20 holds that all institutions within a democratic society must = conform to a=20 single authority principle; a single standard of what counts as = reason and=20 deliberation; a single vocabulary of political discussion. Within = this=20 position, religion is routinely discounted-as the secularization=20 hypothesis would have it--as irrationalism, or as a search for=20 epistemological privilege.

According to liberals like Rawls, citizens who are believers = are=20 obliged to translate every view supported by their beliefs into a=20 purportedly 'neutral' secular language. Only in this way, so the = argument=20 goes, can Americans achieve some kind of workable civic = consensus.

From the standpoint of religious belief, however, 'the problem' = looks=20 quite different: for what Rawls proposes would dramatically narrow = the=20 purview of religion as it actually exists within American civil=20 society.

Rather than asking how much religion can, or should, the polity = tolerate, we might pose a different question instead: What sort of = political arrangements "enable religion to play the constructive = public=20 role that religious commitments themselves demand?" ⁽¹⁾

One enters political life as a citizen. But if one also has = religious=20 convictions, these convictions naturally will inform one's = judgments as a=20 citizen. My religious views help to determine who I am, how I = think, and=20 what I care about. This is as it should be. In America it makes no = sense=20 to ask people to bracket what they care about most deeply when = they debate=20 issues that are properly political.